1.“NATO’s Nuclear Sharing Arrangements Revisited in Light of the NPT and the TPNW”
1.“NATO’s Nuclear Sharing Arrangements Revisited in Light of the NPT and the TPNW”
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1.“根据《不扩散核武器条约》和《TPNW》重新审视北约核共享安排”
DOI：
10.1093/jcsl/krab015
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发表时间：
2021
影响因子：
0.8
通讯作者：
Mika Hayashi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Deepika;R.;Cooper;M.;& Pardo;P.;高澤紀恵）;向井佑介;渡辺悌二;Mika Hayashi
北大西洋公约组织（NATO）的核共享安排是早于《核不扩散条约》（NPT）的安排。本文根据《不扩散核武器条约》重新审视核共享安排，然后根据新条约《禁止核武器条约》（TPNW）研究这些问题。这些安排与《不扩散条约》之间的兼容性问题最初是通过一项谅解得到解决的，即美国在东道国部署核武器并不涉及将这些武器的所有权或控制权转移给东道国。与最初对这种解释的接受相比，当代的接受程度不太牢固。核共享安排在《不扩散核武器条约》审议进程中受到无核武器国家和核武器国家的质疑或批评。相比之下，关于TPNW，似乎没有什么争议； TPNW明确规定缔约国不得允许部署核武器。核共享安排将与这一禁令不相容。该文章还简要讨论了一个单独的问题，即不允许在其领土上部署核武器的延伸核威慑附庸国是否也会违反TPNW的禁令。鉴于《TPNW》条款的范围和性质，文章的结论是，如果这样的客户国在不改变其关于延伸威慑的政策的情况下加入该条约，那么它就会加入该条约。
The nuclear sharing arrangements of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are arrangements that pre-date the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This article revisits the nuclear sharing arrangements in light of the NPT, then examines the issues in light of a new treaty, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). The question of the compatibility between these arrangements and the NPT was initially solved by an understanding that the stationing of the US nuclear weapons in host States did not involve transfer of ownership or transfer of control of these weapons to host States. Compared to the initial acceptance of this interpretation, the contemporary acceptance is less solid. The nuclear sharing arrangements are questioned or criticised in the NPT Review process, both by non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon States. In contrast, with regard to the TPNW, there seems to be no controversy; the TPNW explicitly provides that the States Parties must not allow stationing of nuclear weapons. The nuclear sharing arrangements would be incompatible with this prohibition. The article also briefly deals with a separate question, whether a client State of extended nuclear deterrence that does not allow stationing of nuclear weapons in its territory would also contravene the prohibitions in the TPNW. Given the scope and the nature of provisions of the TPNW, the article concludes that it would, if such a client State joins the treaty without a change in its policy regarding extended deterrence.