Pricing for enabling forwarding in self-configuring ad hoc networks
Pricing for enabling forwarding in self-configuring ad hoc networks
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DOI：
10.1109/wcnc.2004.1311330
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发表时间：
2004-03
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Ömer Ileri;S. Mau;N. Mandayam
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ömer Ileri;S. Mau;N. Mandayam
使用基于博弈论的微观经济框架，我们设计和分析了一个定价算法，鼓励转发自治（自私）节点之间的补偿转发。采用联合的以网络为中心和以用户为中心的方法，收入最大化网络和效用最大化节点通过信道使用的价格、转发的补偿、发射机功率控制以及转发和目的地偏好进行交互。在三节点（两个源，一个接入点）网络中，网络收敛到仅当网络几何结构使得转发可能带来更高的网络效率时才引起转发的架构。对于其他几何结构，网络收敛到不利于转发的架构。我们的特点是每个几何形状的纳什均衡和设计特定的游戏实现，以实现最帕累托上级纳什均衡。在一个一般的多节点网络中，我们的研究结果表明，节点的转发意愿下降的平均节点间距离的平均距离与接入点和节点之间的直接连接到它的平均距离的比值大的值。
Using a microeconomic framework based on game theory, we design and analyze a pricing algorithm that encourages forwarding among autonomous (selfish) nodes by reimbursing forwarding. Taking a joint network-centric and user-centric approach, the revenue maximizing network and utility maximizing nodes interact through prices for channel use, reimbursements for forwarding, transmitter power control as well as forwarding and destination preferences. In a three-node (two sources, one access point) network, the network converges to an architecture that induces forwarding only when the network geometries are such that forwarding is likely to bring higher network efficiency. For other geometries, the network converges to architectures that do not favor forwarding. We characterize the Nash equilibria for each geometry and design specific game implementations to achieve the most Pareto superior Nash equilibrium. In a general multi-node network, our results indicate that the nodes' willingness to forward decrease for large values of the ratio of the average internodal distance to the average distance between the access point and nodes with direct connections to it.