BORDERS AS BOUNDARIES TO FISCAL POLICY INTERACTIONS? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF POLITICIANS' OPINIONS ON RIVALS IN THE COMPETITION FOR FIRMS
BORDERS AS BOUNDARIES TO FISCAL POLICY INTERACTIONS? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF POLITICIANS' OPINIONS ON RIVALS IN THE COMPETITION FOR FIRMS
复制标题
DOI：
10.1111/jors.12029
复制
发表时间：
2013-10-01
影响因子：
3
通讯作者：
Osterloh, Steffen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Geys, Benny;Osterloh, Steffen
在（地方）公共政策的空间政策相互依存的研究通常集中在一个单一的分析区域内的管辖权之间的关系，而忽略了可能的域外影响。然而，理论空间统计文献表明，如果空间相互作用超出可用数据的边界（即，边界值问题）。本文通过研究德国地方政治家在吸引企业的斗争中对其辖区主要竞争对手的评估，实证评估了这种担忧的实际意义。我们发现，靠近边境的位置大大削弱了政治家的看法，即最激烈的竞争压力来自自己国家的管辖区。这种影响发生在距离国家（国际）边界约20公里（10.2公里）处。这些结果表明，最近的城市认为对方的竞争对手，无论他们所在的州或国家，这对估计空间依赖模型具有重要意义。
Studies of spatial policy interdependence in (local) public policies usually concentrate on the relations between jurisdictions within a single analyzed region, and disregard possible extraregional effects. However, the theoretical spatial statistics literature shows that biased estimates might emerge if spatial interactions extend beyond the boundaries of the available data (i.e., the boundary value problem). This paper empirically assesses the practical relevance of this concern by studying German local politicians' assessments of their jurisdictions' main competitors in the struggle to attract firms. We find that location near a border significantly undermines politicians' perception that the fiercest competitive pressure derives from jurisdictions within their own state. This effect sets in about 20 km (10.2 km) from a national (international) border. These results indicate that nearest municipalities perceive each other as competitors regardless of the state or country where they are located, which has important implications for estimating spatial dependence models.