Competition, Quality and Contract Compliance: Evidence from Compulsory Competitive Tendering in Local Government in Great Britain, 1987–2000*
Competition, Quality and Contract Compliance: Evidence from Compulsory Competitive Tendering in Local Government in Great Britain, 1987–2000*
复制标题
竞争、质量和合同合规：1987-2000 年英国地方政府强制竞争性招标的证据*
DOI：
10.1111/j.1475-5890.2012.00171.x
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
7.3
通讯作者：
Luis Angeles
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Milne;G. Roy;Luis Angeles
人们经常发现，引入竞争会导致成本下降。然而，有一个问题是，这是否在一定程度上是以牺牲质量为代价的。拍卖理论预测，提供服务的竞争越激烈，价格就会下降得越多。关于预算减少是否会使合同履约更加困难，存在一些争论。有证据支持这一假设。我们还发现一些证据表明，在此期间，内部直接服务组织（DSO）的业绩记录更好，是由于他们从现任者的信息优势。
The introduction of competition has frequently been found to cause costs to fall. There has, however, been a question as to whether this was partly achieved at the cost of quality. Auction theory predicts prices would fall more the greater the competition to provide the service. There has been some debate about whether the smaller budgets would make contract compliance more difficult. Evidence is found in support of this hypothesis. We also find some evidence that the better recorded performance of the in-house direct service organisations (DSOs) during this period was due to the information advantage they had from being incumbents.