Policy effects on transitional welfare in an overlapping generations model: a pay-as-you-go pension reconsidered
Policy effects on transitional welfare in an overlapping generations model: a pay-as-you-go pension reconsidered
复制标题
世代重叠模型中政策对过渡福利的影响：重新考虑现收现付养老金
DOI：
10.1016/j.econmod.2018.12.005
复制
发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
4.7
通讯作者：
Weizhen Hu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Yuya Tanaka;Saburo Okazaki;Yuhei Ogawa;Masahiro Endo;Hisao Matsunaga;田中佑弥;Yuya Tanaka;Weizhen Hu
我们研究了现收现付(PAYG)养老金制度在转型和稳定状态下的福利效应，说明了总福利效应是如何由对资本的累积效应决定的。理论研究表明，在动态效率下，PYG养老金制度的引入降低了稳态福利。然而，这种养老金制度在现实世界中得到了广泛采用。为了解释这一点，我们用代数和图解的方法证明了在动态效率下，现收现付制养老金制度在过渡阶段是帕累托改进的。同样，人们认识到，这种养老金制度应该在动态低效的情况下引入，因为它改善了稳定状态的福利。然而，我们发现，现收现付制养老金制度在转型过程中可能正在帕累托恶化。我们的研究结果表明，政府采用现收现付制养老金制度是为了实现长期福利最大化以外的政策目标。
We study the welfare effects of a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system in transition, as well as in the steady state, by showing how the total welfare effects are determined by a cumulative effect on capital. Theoretical studies have shown that the introduction of a PAYG pension system reduces steady-state welfare under dynamic efficiency. Nevertheless, such pension systems have been widely adopted in the real world. To explain this, we algebraically and graphically prove that the PAYG pension system could be Pareto-improving in transition under dynamic efficiency. Similarly, it is acknowledged that this pension system should be introduced under dynamic inefficiency because it improves steady-state welfare. However, we show that the PAYG pension system may be Pareto-deteriorating in transition. Our findings imply that governments adopt PAYG pension systems to achieve policy targets other than long-run welfare maximization.