Smoke with Fire: Financial Crises, Institutional Reform, and the Future of EU Democracy
Smoke with Fire: Financial Crises, Institutional Reform, and the Future of EU Democracy
复制标题
烟与火：金融危机、机构改革和欧盟民主的未来
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2181987
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
G. Schneider
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
G. Schneider
欧盟（EU）对主权债务危机的处理引发了人们的担忧，即超国家组织及其成员国的决策变得不那么民主，欧洲央行现在在欧洲发号施令。本文用过去金融危机的制度性后果的系统证据来反驳这种悲观的猜测。我们提出了一个适应现代化的论点，并期望与欧盟“民主赤字”的新辩论相反，严重的经济危机提高了民主和中央银行独立性的水平。面板回归模型支持双重猜想，即日益增长的民主和技术官僚决策应该是严重经济危机的结果。鉴于这些发现，我们有理由相信，欧洲货币联盟危机已经耗尽了欧洲立法机构的权力。我们对欧盟改革潜力的评估可以归结为一个论点，即条约修正案需要纠正《里斯本条约》创造的超国家议程设定的可能性，而《财政契约条约》进一步加强了这一可能性。
The handling of the sovereign debt crisis in the European Union (EU) has raised fears that decision making in supranational organization and its member states has become less democratic and that European Central Bank now calls the shots in Europe. This article confronts this pessimistic speculation with systematic evidence of the institutional consequences of past financial crises. We advance an adapted modernization argument and expect in contrast to the renewed debate over the “Democratic deficit” of the EU that severe economic crises have increased the level of both democracy and central bank independence. Panel regression models support the double conjecture that growing democratic and technocratic decision making should be a consequence of severe economic crises. We qualify in light of these findings the widespread pessimism that the EMU crisis has depleted the power of the European legislatures. Our assessment of the reform potential of the EU boils down to the contention that treaty amendments need to rectify the potential for supranational agenda setting that that the Treaty of Lisbon has created and that the Fiscal Compact Treaty has further strengthened.