ARC: an integrated admission and rate control framework for competitive wireless CDMA data networks using noncooperative games
ARC: an integrated admission and rate control framework for competitive wireless CDMA data networks using noncooperative games
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DOI：
10.1109/tmc.2005.35
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发表时间：
2005-05
影响因子：
7.9
通讯作者：
Haitao Lin;M. Chatterjee;Sajal K. Das;K. Basu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Haitao Lin;M. Chatterjee;Sajal K. Das;K. Basu
无线数据服务提供商之间的竞争为不满意的客户提供了一种选择，即客户流失。无线本地号码可携性（WLNP）的实施预计将进一步增加流失率（用户转换提供商的概率）。然而，现有的无线网络资源管理算法未能充分捕捉这种不可预见的竞争力的深远影响。从这个角度来看，我们首先制定服务提供商和用户之间的非合作博弈。用户离开或加入提供商的决定是基于一组有限的策略。服务提供商还可以构建其博弈策略集，以便考虑流失率来最大化其效用（收入）。基于博弈论的框架，我们提出了一个综合的接纳和速率控制（ARC）的框架，基于CDMA的无线数据网络。准入控制在会话（宏）级，而速率控制在链路层分组（微）级。两种接纳控制模式被认为是一个接一个的模式和批处理模式，其中多个用户被接纳的时间。我们证明：1）对于一对一模式，无论系统处于欠载还是满载状态，都可以建立纯策略纳什均衡; 2）对于批处理模式，服务提供商要么存在纯策略均衡，要么存在优势策略均衡。因此，供应商明确规定了准入标准作为游戏的结果。用户被分为多个类别，并根据他们支付的价格和他们可以容忍的服务降级提供差异化服务。我们表明，建议ARC框架显着增加供应商的收入，也成功地提供了差异化的QoS的用户。
The competition among wireless data service providers brings in an option for the unsatisfied customers to switch their providers, which is called churning. The implementation of Wireless Local Number Portability (WLNP) is expected to further increase the churn rate (the probability of users switching the provider). However, the existing resource management algorithms for wireless networks fail to fully capture the far-reaching impact of this unforeseen competitiveness. From this perspective, we first formulate noncooperative games between the service providers and the users. A user's decision to leave or join a provider is based on a finite set of strategies. A service provider can also construct its game strategy set so as to maximize their utility (revenue) considering the churn rate. Based on the game theoretic framework, we propose an integrated admission and rate control (ARC) framework for CDMA-based wireless data networks. The admission control is at the session (macro) level while the rate control is at the link layer packet (micro) level. Two admission control modes are considered - one-by-one mode and batch processing mode, in which multiple users are admitted at a time. We show that: 1) for the one-by-one mode, the Nash equilibrium using pure strategy can be established for both under-loaded and fully-loaded systems and 2) for batch processing mode, there is either an equilibrium in pure strategy or a dominant strategy exists for the service provider. Therefore, the providers have clearly defined admission criteria as outcome of the game. Users are categorized into multiple classes and offered differentiated services based on the price they pay and the service degradation they can tolerate. We show that the proposed ARC framework significantly increases the provider's revenue and also successfully offers differentiated QoS to the users.