Employee Control and Oligopoly in a Free Market Economy
Employee Control and Oligopoly in a Free Market Economy
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自由市场经济中的员工控制和寡头垄断
DOI：
10.2307/20075935
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发表时间：
1994
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
J. Crémer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
H. Cremer;J. Crémer
我们研究的是双寡头市场，在这种市场中，利润最大化的公司与利润最大化的公司竞争。我们首先研究一个具有古诺竞争的产业。我们发现，一个企业控制的企业的存在并不影响均衡的企业数量，降低总产量，提高价格，减少社会福利。企业控制的企业比其竞争对手具有更小的均衡产量。对于霍特林型竞争在市场上的多样化产品，我们表明，均衡位置不受员工控制，价格上涨，社会福利下降。被收购公司的市场份额低于其竞争对手。令人惊讶的是，当控制权从股东转移到其中一家公司的员工时，两家公司的利润都能增加。最后，我们表明，员工不会想买一个公司从它的所有者。
We study duopolistic markets where a profit-maximizing firm competes with an employee-controlled firm that maximizes value-added per employee. We first study an industry with Cournot competition. We show that the presence of an employee-controlled firm does not affect the equilibrium number of firms, lowers aggregate output, increases price and reduces social welfare. The employee-controlled firm has a smaller equilibrium output than its competitor. For Hotelling type competition in a market with diversified products, we show that equilibrium locations are not affected by employee control, that prices increase and that social welfare decreases. The market share of the employee-controlled firm is lower than that of its competitor. Surprisingly, the profits of both firms can increase when control is transferred from stockholders to employees in one of them. Finally, we show that employees would not want to buy a firm from its owners.