The Politics of FDI Expropriation
The Politics of FDI Expropriation
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外国直接投资征用的政治
DOI：
10.1111/iere.12277
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Marina Azzimonti
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Marina Azzimonti
我研究了政治不稳定的作用，作为一个潜在的解释缺乏资本流动从富国到穷国（即“卢卡斯Parket”）。使用1984年至2014年的面板数据，我记录了以下内容：（i）发达国家表现出更大的外国直接投资（FDI）流入，（ii）投资风险高的国家通常是那些接受低FDI流入的国家，（iii）在细分和政治不稳定的经济体中，投资风险通常较高。这些研究结果表明，政治不稳定和外国直接投资之间的负相关关系，通过投资风险渠道。然后，我检查的理论机制，使用动态的政治经济模型的再分配，其中政策制定者有机会获得征用技术，可用于提取资源从外国投资者。这些收入被用于资助向家庭佣工的特定群体的转移，但由于阻碍外国直接投资而阻碍了经济增长。不同的社会群体竞相获得对这一工具的控制权，但在每个时间点都面临失去权力的可能性。政治更替程度越大，执政时的征用动机越强。造成这一结果的一个关键因素是再分配的不确定性，因为将来可能收不到任何转移支付。这一机制得到以下结论的支持：投资风险（衡量使用采掘技术的程度的一项措施）与外国直接投资和政府稳定性呈负相关。最后，我表明，政治均衡表现出过度征用和投资不足，即使没有政治上的不确定性，因为细分社会遭受静态低效率，由于存在一个共同的游泳池问题。
I examine the role of political instability as a potential explanation for the lack of capital flows from rich countries to poor countries (i.e. the `Lucas Paradox'). Using panel data from 1984 to 2014, I document the following: (i) developed countries exhibit larger inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI), (ii) countries subject to high investment risk are those that typically receive low FDI inflows, and (iii) investment risk is generally higher in fractionalized and politically unstable economies. These findings suggest a negative relationship between political instability and FDI through the investment risk channel. I then inspect the theoretical mechanism using a dynamic political-economy model of redistribution, wherein policymakers have access to an expropriation technology that can be used to extract resources from foreign investors. The proceeds are used to finance group-specific transfers to domestic workers, but hinder economic growth by discouraging FDI. Different social groups compete to gain control of this instrument, but face a probability of losing power at each point in time. The greater the degree of political turnover is, the stronger the incentives to expropriate when in power. A key force driving this result is redistributive uncertainty, since there is a possibility that no transfers will be received in the future. The mechanism is supported by the finding that investment risk (a measure that captures the degree to which the extraction technology is used) is negatively related to FDI and government stability. Finally, I show that the political equilibrium exhibits over-expropriation and under-investment even when there is no political uncertainty because fractionalized societies suffer from static inefficiencies due to the presence of a common pool problem.