Making Justice Sensitive to Responsibility
Making Justice Sensitive to Responsibility
复制标题
让正义对责任敏感
DOI：
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Zofia Stemplowska
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Zofia Stemplowska
什么时候，如果有的话，一个人对他或她的劣势负责的事实可以证明让他或她承受这种劣势？在过去二十年里，可能没有其他问题比这个问题更能引起平等主义政治理论家的争论了。本文旨在表明，在不接受对责任的关注只是平等主义正义理论的边缘这一结论的情况下，有可能超越这个通常（或对或错）归因于运气平等主义者的问题的答案。我指出了在哪些条件下，通过履行责任所带来的不利应被视为公正，并说明了为什么关心公平份额的平等主义者有时甚至必须将严重的不利接受为公正。
When, if at all, can the fact that a person is responsible for his or her disadvantage justify leaving him or her to bear that disadvantage? Possibly no other question has caused more controversy among political theorists of egalitarianism in the last two decades. This article aims to show that it is possible to move beyond the answer to this question that is usually (rightly or wrongly) attributed to luck egalitarians without accepting the conclusion that a concern with responsibility is only marginal to theories of egalitarian justice. I identify the conditions under which disadvantage brought about through the exercise of responsibility should be accepted as just and show why egalitarians concerned with fair shares must sometimes accept as just even grave disadvantages.