Welfare and labor supply implications of tax competition for mobile labor
Welfare and labor supply implications of tax competition for mobile labor
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流动劳动力税收竞争对福利和劳动力供给的影响
DOI：
10.1007/s00355-015-0898-z
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发表时间：
2015
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Alfons J. Weichenrieder
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
V. Lipatov;Alfons J. Weichenrieder
我们将流动劳动力的税收竞争引入具有两种技能水平的最优税收模型中，并分析了两个政府和两个纳税人群体之间博弈的子博弈完美纳什均衡。税收竞争减少了信息不对称造成的扭曲，增加了生产力较低的个人的劳动力供给。当其中一个国家人口较多时，这种效应在较小的国家更为明显。税收竞争通常会使社会更加自由主义。高技能和低技能的特定福利效应取决于政府目标函数的形式。
We introduce tax competition for mobile labor into an optimal-taxation model with two skill levels and analyze a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the game between two governments and two taxpayer populations. Tax competition reduces the distortion from the informational asymmetry and increases labor supply of the less productive individuals. When one of the countries has a larger population, this effect is more pronounced in the smaller country. Tax competition generally tends to make societies more libertarian. Particular welfare effects for high and low skilled depend on the form of the government objective function.