Joint Projects without Commitment
Joint Projects without Commitment
复制标题
无承诺的联合项目
DOI：
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发表时间：
1991
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Motty Perry
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Anat R. Admati;Motty Perry
本文讨论了当没有承诺和可执行合同时对联合项目的贡献模式。我们分析了一个博弈，在这个博弈中，合作伙伴轮流为项目做出贡献，直到项目完成。捐款在作出时即被沉没。这个博弈有一个独特的子博弈完美均衡路径，在社会期望的项目可能无法完成的意义上，这是低效的。相比之下，在“订阅游戏”中，只有当承诺用于项目的捐款支付其成本时，捐款的成本才被承担，结果是有效率的。
This paper concerns the pattern of contributions to a joint project when commitments and enforceable contracts are not available. We analyse a game in which partners alternate in making contributions to the project until the project is completed. Contributions are sunk when they are made. The game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium path, which is inefficient in the sense that socially desirable projects may not be completed. By contrast, in a "subscription game" in which the cost of the contribution is borne only if and when the contributions committed to the project cover its cost, the outcome is efficient.