When Movements Become Parties: The Bolivian MAS in Comparative Perspective
When Movements Become Parties: The Bolivian MAS in Comparative Perspective
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当运动变成政党：比较视角下的玻利维亚争取社会主义运动
DOI：
10.1177/0094306120902418b
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发表时间：
2020
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Edwin F. Ackerman
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作者：
Edwin F. Ackerman
玻利维亚社会主义运动（MAS）从农村工团主义和古柯叶种植合作社的核心发展成为过去十年的主导政党。 MAS 的权力崛起始于 20 世纪 90 年代中期，在其领导人和该国现任总统埃沃·莫拉莱斯 (Evo Morales) 的领导下不断扩张领土并吸纳新的社会行动者。从2005年开始，争取社会主义运动已经连续赢得了三届总统选举。政治学家圣地亚哥·安里亚在《运动成为政党：比较视角下的玻利维亚争取社会主义运动》一书中描绘了争取社会主义运动的发展和权力任期，他将注意力集中在一个政治社会学家普遍感兴趣的问题上：该党的社会运动起源与其随后的选举专业化之间的关系。安里亚将他的论点表达为对罗伯特·米歇尔斯基础政党社会学核心理论见解的挑战。米歇尔斯的预期是“寡头铁律”，这必然导致社会运动分子在党内决策过程中的权力逐渐减弱以及相应的精英盘踞。人们的假设是，当政党成为由政治精英的官僚阶层领导的专门组织时，它们将逐渐脱离其社会基础。然而，安里亚认为，正是由于该党的社会运动起源，该党已经找到了抵制自上而下控制趋势的方法。通过对政党精英和社会运动领导人的大量访谈（超过 170 次），作者认为草根社会基础对选举公职候选人的选择和政策制定领域具有重大影响力（第 4 页）。该党自成立以来就形成了自下而上的组织模式。它源于具有悠久的参与政治传统的农村社会运动，促进内部草根参与作为其创始组织特征。采用松散的官僚结构促进了联盟团体之间反对派的存在，以从内部检查权力（第17页）。从这个意义上说，Anria 希望强调政党的组织属性如何影响内部权力分配，并受到组织发展早期阶段出现的特征的制约（第 33 页）。在忠于本书引言中提出的总体论点的同时，以实证为导向的章节提供了一个更细致的图景，即社会主义运动是一个“混合政党”，它包含政党精英，但与某些地区的社会运动基础保持有机联系。安里亚令人信服地指出，在与党结盟的自治社会运动组织具有凝聚力、拥有决策机制并能够就候选人选择达成一致的地区，党领导层不太可能进行层级决策。这种权力分配在玻利维亚西部农村地区很常见，那里的地区通常更加同质，并且拥有垄断政治空间的强大组织。另一方面，在公民社会强大但有多党结盟和/或无法就候选人达成一致的地方，更有可能进行自上而下的决策。这是在社会异质环境（西方大城市）中观察到的模式。同样，在公民社会强大但与其他政党结盟的背景下，MAS 领导层将权力集中在一小部分政党精英手中，战略性地选择 136 条评论
The Bolivian party Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) grew from a core of rural syndicalist and coca-leaf grower cooperatives into the dominant political party of the past decade. The MAS’s ascent to power began in the mid-1990s, expanding territorially and integrating new social actors under its leader and the country’s current president Evo Morales. The MAS has won three presidential elections in a row beginning in 2005. Santiago Anria, a political scientist, charts the development and tenure in power of the MAS in When Movements Become Parties: The Bolivian MAS in Comparative Perspective, focusing his attention on a question that will be of interest to political sociologists at large: the relationship between the party’s social movement origins and its subsequent electoral professionalization. Anria couches his argument as a challenge to the central theoretical insight of Robert Michels’s foundational sociology of political parties. The expectation derived from Michels is of an ‘‘iron law of oligarchy,’’ which will inevitably result in the gradual decrease in power of social movement elements in the internal decision-making process of the party and corresponding elite entrenchment. Parties, the assumption is, will become gradually detached from their social base as they become specialized organizations led by a bureaucratized caste of political elites. Anria argues, however, that the MAS has found ways to counteract the trend toward top-down control precisely due to the party’s social movement origins. With recourse to an impressive number of interviews (over 170) of party elites and social movement leaders, the author contends that the grassroots social base wields significant influence over the selection of candidates for elective office and in the policy-making sphere (p. 4). The party developed a bottom-up pattern of organization since it began. Emerging from a rural social movement with a long tradition of participatory politics, it promoted internal grassroots participation as a founding organizational characteristic. Adopting a loose bureaucratic structure facilitated the existence of opposition among allied groups to check power from within (p. 17). In this sense, Anria wishes to highlight how the organizational attributes of parties have an effect on internal power distributions and are conditioned by characteristics emerging in the early stages of development of the organization (p. 33). While staying true to the overall argument set forth in the introduction of the book, the empirically oriented chapters offer a more nuanced picture of the MAS as a ‘‘hybrid party’’ that contains a party elite but retains organic connections to a social movement base in certain regions. Anria argues convincingly that hierarchical decision-making by the party’s leadership is less likely to take place in areas where autonomous social movement organizations aligned with the party are cohesive, have mechanisms to arrive at decisions, and can agree on candidate selection. This power distribution is commonly seen in Bolivia’s rural west, where districts are generally more homogeneous and have strong organizations monopolizing the political space. On the other hand, in places where civil society is strong but has multiple party alignments and/or cannot agree on a candidate, top-down decisionmaking is more likely. This is a pattern observed in socially heterogeneous environments (large cities in the west). Along the same lines, in contexts where civil society is strong but has aligned with other parties, the MAS leadership concentrates power in a small party elite, strategically selecting 136 Reviews