European Union enlargement: Power distribution implications of the new institutional arrangements
European Union enlargement: Power distribution implications of the new institutional arrangements
复制标题
DOI：
10.1111/1475-6765.t01-1-00016
复制
发表时间：
2002-05
影响因子：
5.3
通讯作者：
F. Aleskerov;Gamze Avcı;Viatcheslav Iakouba;Z. U. Türem
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
F. Aleskerov;Gamze Avcı;Viatcheslav Iakouba;Z. U. Türem
抽象的。有人认为，扩大挑战机构的平衡，特别是在欧洲联盟（欧盟）内的国家行为体的相对权力。本文以1800年12月尼斯首脑会议的决定为基础，着重探讨未来欧盟扩大（目前正在谈判的12个候选国）对欧盟理事会和欧洲议会权力分配的影响。它使用Shapley-Shubik和Banzhaf指数来评估理事会和议会中过去和新出现的权力分配。其中有一个关于土耳其（第十三个非谈判的正式候选国）的简短章节，以评估其加入欧盟可能产生的影响。
Abstract. It is argued that enlargement challenges institutional balances and in particular relative powers of national actors within the European Union (EU). This article concentrates on the impact of future enlargement (with the current negotiating 12 candidates) on power distribution in the Council of Ministers of the European Union and the European Parliament based on the decisions taken at the Nice Summit in December 1800. It uses the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices to evaluate past and emerging power distributions in both the Council and in the Parliament. A brief section on Turkey (the thirteenth, non-negotiating, official candidate) is included to evaluate its possible impact in the case of admission to the Union.