A theory of debt and equity: diversity of securities and manager-shareholder congruence
A theory of debt and equity: diversity of securities and manager-shareholder congruence
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DOI：
10.2307/2118355
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发表时间：
1994-11
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
M. Dewatripont;J. Tirole
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
M. Dewatripont;J. Tirole
本文展示了企业最优财务结构如何对纪律管理人员的激励方案进行补充，以及证券收益流如何决定索赔权持有人干预管理的激励。该理论合理化了(1)证券的多重性，(2)观察到的回报流与证券控制权之间的相关性，以及(3)管理层和股权持有人在政策选择和货币奖励方面的偏好部分一致，以及股权对管理的低干预程度。该理论还为重新评估早期公司财务文献提供了新的前景。
This paper shows how the optimal financial structure of a firm complements incentive schemes to discipline managers, and how the securities’ return streams determine the claim-holders’ incentives to intervene in management. The theory rationalizes (1) the multipUcity of securities, (2) the observed correlation between return streams and control rights of securities, and (3) the partial congruence between managerial and equity-holder preferences over policy choices and monetary rewards as well as the low level of interference of equity in management. The theory also offers new prospects for a reappraisal of the earlier corporate finance literature.