Doing Harm by Doing Good? The Negative Externalities of Humanitarian Aid Provision during Civil Conflict

Doing Harm by Doing Good? The Negative Externalities of Humanitarian Aid Provision during Civil Conflict
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行善有害吗?

DOI:
10.1086/681239
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发表时间:
2015
期刊:
The Journal of Politics
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Christopher M. Sullivan
Christopher M. Sullivan
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
Reed M. Wood;Christopher M. Sullivan

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人道主义援助的目的是通过向易受伤害的人口提供救济来减轻战争给人类造成的损失。然而,向冲突地区提供援助资源可能会影响随后的暴力模式,并使预期的受援者面临新的风险。在这里,我们调查与人道主义援助相关的潜在负面外部性。我们认为,援助可以激励武装行为者故意以平民为暴力目标。援助为抢劫提供了机会,并向反对派当局提出了挑战,从而助长了反对派的暴力行为。它可能鼓励国家暴力,因为它增强了反对派的能力或为反对派提供了资源基础。我们对近二十几个冷战后非洲国家的援助和冲突暴力样本进行了空间分类数据评估。多项统计分析的结果有力地支持了人道主义援助与叛乱暴力增加有关的论点,但对援助与国家暴力之间关系的支持较少。
Humanitarian assistance is intended to ameliorate the human costs of war by providing relief to vulnerable populations. Yet the introduction of aid resources into conflict zones may influence subsequent violence patterns and expose intended recipients to new risks. Here we investigate the potential negative externalities associated with humanitarian aid. We argue that aid can create incentives for armed actors to intentionally target civilians for violence. Aid encourages rebel violence by providing opportunities for looting and presenting challenges to rebel authority. It potentially encourages state violence where it augments rebel capabilities or provides rebels a resource base. We evaluate both arguments using spatially disaggregated data on aid and conflict violence for a sample of nearly two dozen post–Cold War African countries. The results of multiple statistical analyses provide strong support for the argument that humanitarian aid is associated with increased rebel violence but less support for the relationship between aid and state violence.