Creative Reconstructions: Multilateralism and European Varieties of Capitalism after 1950
Creative Reconstructions: Multilateralism and European Varieties of Capitalism after 1950
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创造性重建：多边主义和 1950 年后的欧洲资本主义
DOI：
10.1080/01402382.2012.682424
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发表时间：
2012
影响因子：
4.2
通讯作者：
Martin Rhodes
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Martin Rhodes
《创造性重建》试图考察战后欧洲国内经济改革议程与多边承诺(主要是对欧盟的承诺)之间的关系，重点是英国、法国和德国。作者坚定地致力于解释国家和国际力量如何共同塑造跨越多个经济领域、国家和时期的改革。分析方法同样雄心勃勃。菲奥雷托斯开始在两部著作中进行批评和创新：一是政治经济学的“资本主义变种”(VOC)方法，他指责这种方法忽视了国际制度；另一种是历史制度主义，他说，这种方法过分强调路径依赖，暴露了一种决定论的倾向(这一批评也经常由VOC构成)。根据作者的说法，答案是首先将历史制度主义与行为经济学相结合，创建他所称的“行为制度主义”。他认为，这使得“那些参考特定制度变化的潜在成本和收益来制定经济和政治战略的人，可以有一种更微妙的行动理论”。第二步是把我们的注意力转向多边主义在理解国家经济转型方面的作用，特别是“各国政府将国家计划纳入多边环境的方式如何塑造了它们实施国内改革的能力”。新制度经济学的理论也很重要，因为科斯和威廉姆森的见解是该理论的核心，作者非常重视可信承诺的概念--特别是企业对现有和可供选择的“设计”的承诺的可信度(他指的是国家或国际层面的制度体系)。对于Fioretos，他试图研究什么时候以及如何“企业偏好将在什么条件下加强或转变，从而企业环境中的不同类型的变化将如何影响它们作为政府拥护者对改革议程的承诺的可信度”。与VOC一样，这也是一种政治经济学的方法，在这种方法中，公司--尤其是“关键公司”--是核心。事实上，这本书的大部分内容--无论是在理论上还是在实践中--都是关于政府如何与企业互动，以及企业偏好对政府改革议程的形成和成功是多么关键。该书将国民经济视为“开放的治理体系”，主要关注的是“政府解决所谓的设计问题的方式”，以及这如何“影响它们为国内改革议程争取支持的能力”。这里的“设计问题”涉及“政府和其他经济行为者如何协调机构的内部整合与它们融入外部环境的整合”。作者所指的是各国经济融入多边体系(如欧盟)在多大程度上与企业对现有机构的承诺相适应，或产生企业将接受或拒绝的适应成本。这三个经验性章节致力于探讨自20世纪50年代以来，各国政府寻求解决“设计问题”的方式及其对国民经济的影响。这一切合乎情理吗？这本书的巨大优势在于，它(成功地)尝试对国家经济和多边协议之间的关系进行建模，企业-政府二元组(对于其他参与者来说几乎不算)是这种关系的调解人。因此，各国政府将努力确保多边‘设计’与那些对本国…最关键的公司和行业的偏好保持一致
Creative Reconstructions seeks to examine the relationship between domestic economic reform agendas and multilateral commitments (primarily to the EU) in postwar Europe, focusing on Britain, France and Germany. The author undertakes resolutely to explain the ways in which national and international forces have jointly shaped reforms across multiple economic domains, countries and periods. The analytical approach is no less ambitious. Fioretos sets out to criticise and innovate in two literatures: the ‘varieties of capitalism’(VoC) approach to political economy, which he accuses of ignoring international institutions, and historical institutionalism which, he says, over-emphasises path dependencies and betrays a tendency towards determinism (a critique often made of VoC as well). The answer, according to the author, is first to merge historical institutionalism with behavioural economics, to create what he dubs ‘behavioural institutionalism’. This allows, he argues,‘a more nuanced theory of action of those who devise their economic and political strategies with reference to potential costs and benefits from specific institutional changes’. The second step is to turn our attention to the role of multilateralism in understanding the transformation of national economies, and specifically ‘how the manner in which governments embedded national programs in multilateral contexts shaped their ability to implement domestic reforms’. Theories from new institutional economics are also important, for the insights of Coase and Williamson are central to the theory, and the author makes much of the notion of credible commitments–in particular the credibility of firms’ commitments to existing and alternative ‘designs’(by which he means institutional systems, at national or international levels). For Fioretos seeks to examine when and how ‘the conditions under which firm preferences will intensify or be transformed and thus how different types of changes in firms’ environment will affect the credibility of their commitments to the reform agendas governments champion’. Like VoC, this is an approach to political economy in which the firm–especially the ‘pivotal firm’-is central. Indeed, much of the book–in both its theoretical and empirical chapters–is about how governments interact with business, and how critical business preferences are to the formation and success of governments’ reform agendas.Treating national economies as ‘open systems of governance’, the book’s main preoccupation is with ‘the manner in which governments resolve what is known as the design problem’and how that ‘affects their ability to build support for domestic reform agendas’. The ‘design problem’here concerns ‘how governments and other economic actors reconcile the internal integration of institutions with their integration into the external environment’. By which the author means the extent to which the embedding of national economies in multilateral systems (eg the EU) is incentive-compatible with firms’ commitments to existing institutions, or creates adaptation costs which firms will accept or reject. The three empirical chapters are devoted to exploring how and with what effect for national economies governments have sought to resolve the ‘design problem’since the 1950s. Does this all add up? The great strength of the book lies in its (successful) attempt to model the relationship between national economies and multilateral agreements, with the business–government dyad (for other actors barely figure) as the mediators of that relationship. Thus governments will try to ensure that multilateral ‘designs’ are consistent with the preferences of those firms and sectors most critical for their national …