RISK-AVERSE RENT SEEKERS AND THE SOCIAL COST OF MONOPOLY POWER
RISK-AVERSE RENT SEEKERS AND THE SOCIAL COST OF MONOPOLY POWER
复制标题
规避风险的寻租者和垄断权力的社会成本
DOI：
10.2307/2232219
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发表时间：
1984
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
E. Katz
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Hillman;E. Katz
现在人们普遍认识到，垄断权力的社会成本包括个人为成为垄断租金受益者而消耗的资源。然而，由于寻租活动一般是不可观察的，因此通常不可能对为获取垄断权力而消耗的资源进行直接估计。1因此，在评估此类活动的社会成本时，普遍采用以垄断租金的观测值来表示寻租所消耗的资源的不可观测价值的间接方法。
There is now quite general recognition that the social cost of monopoly power encompasses the resources expended by individuals seeking to become the beneficiaries of monopoly rents. However, since the activity of rent seeking is generally not observable, direct estimates of resources expended in quests to acquire monopoly power are usually impossible to come by.1 As a consequence, the indirect approach of taking the observed value of monopoly rents as indicative of the unobserved value of the resources expended in rent seeking is quite generally adopted in approaches to evaluation of the social cost of such activity.