Guarantees and Risk-Sharing
Guarantees and Risk-Sharing
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DOI：
10.2307/2296907
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发表时间：
1977-10
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
G. Heal
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
G. Heal
消费者经常不确定他购买的产品的质量，因此也不确定该产品能否在多大程度上为他提供他可能期望的服务，这一事实正得到越来越多的认可。在早期的论文 [5] 中，我在一个简单的框架中研究了产品质量不确定性的变化对消费者需求的影响，并简要讨论了保证的影响。在本文中，我想更详细地探讨担保的存在所带来的一些经济问题。有几个有用的区别可以作为更详细研究的初步内容。一是买家和卖家拥有平等的信息获取权的情况和卖家拥有优先的信息获取权的情况之间的区别。第一种情况是一个市场，其中交易的产品质量确实是随机的，买家和卖家都知道其分布。因此，如果已知某个工厂生产的汽车中有一定比例 p 有缺陷，那么零售商向买家出售汽车的交易就属于这一类：每个人都知道汽车有缺陷的可能性是 p，但是，因为汽车未被使用，所以都不知道它是否实际上有缺陷。将此与汽车的第一个车主转售汽车的情况进行对比：现在存在一个重要的不对称性，因为卖方比买方更了解产品的质量。阿克洛夫非常有趣的分析[1]主要关注的是这种情况，我也在[4]中对此进行了讨论。然而，我在这里主要关心的是信息平等的情况。随便想一想这种情况，很明显可以区分担保的激励效应和风险分担效应。激励效应的产生是因为保证的存在为生产者提供了提高其产品质量的激励，至少在减少其低于保证水平的机会方面。如果发生故障时的补偿不完全，那么消费者也有动力去维护产品。例如，在二手车担保中，买方和卖方将各支付一半的维修费用，这为双方提供了尽量减少这些费用的激励。当然，如果保证仅在有限的时间内有效，那么就会产生进一步的效果，即为购买者提供激励，以确保如果出现故障，它会在产品生命周期的早期发生。这可能与其他效果相反，并降低他维护产品的渴望。除了产生上述激励效应外，担保还可以作为分担与产品质量不确定性相关的风险的一种方式：从这个意义上讲，为了提高效率，它将根据参与者的风险厌恶程度来分配该风险。我在这里主要关心的是担保的风险分担方面。部分原因是这些似乎是问题最容易处理的方面，但也源于这样一种信念：这些是最重要的方面。随意的经验主义表明，除非在相当独特的情况下，产品通常是在考虑保证条款的选择之前设计和生产的：然后将这些条款选择为营销方案的一部分。在这种情况下，产品的可靠性显然将独立于
The fact that a consumer is frequently uncertain about the quality of a product that he purchases, and is therefore also unsure of the extent to which it will render him the services he might expect of it, is one that is gaining increasing recognition. In an earlier paper [5] I examined in a simple framework the effects of changes in the uncertainty about a product's quality on the consumer's demand, and also touched briefly on the effect of a guarantee. In this paper I want to examine in more detail some of the economic issues posed by the existence of guarantees. There are several useful distinctions that can be drawn as a preliminary to more detailed study. One is a distinction between situations where buyers and sellers have equal access to information, and a situation where sellers have superior access. The first situation is exemplified by a market where trade is in a product whose quality is genuinely random, with the distribution known to both buyers and sellers. Thus if a certain fraction p of the cars from a given factory are generally known to be faulty, then a transaction in which a retailer sells a car to a buyer comes into this category: each knows that the chance of the car being faulty is p, but, because the car is unused, neither knows whether it is actually faulty. Contrast this with a situation where the first owner of the car is reselling it: now there is an important asymmetry, in that the seller is much better informed about the quality of the product than the buyer. This is the case with which Akerlof's very interesting analysis [1] is largely concerned, and which I have also discussed in [4]. My main concern here, however, is with a situation of equal information. Thinking casually about such a situation, it is clear that one can distinguish between the incentive effects and the risk-sharing effects of a guarantee. Incentive effects arise because the existence of a guarantee provides the producer with an incentive to improve the quality of his product, at least to the extent of reducing the chances of its falling below the guaranteed level. If the compensation in the event of failure is less than complete, then the consumer also has an incentive to maintain the product. For example, a used car guarantee, under which the buyer and seller will each pay half of any repair bills, provides both parties with incentives to minimize these bills. Of course, if the guarantee is valid for only a limited period of time, then there is the further effect of providing the buyer with an incentive to ensure that if there is to be a failure, it occurs early in the product's life. This may act in opposition to the other effect, and reduce his eagerness to maintain the product. In addition to creating the incentive effects mentioned, a guarantee also acts as a way of sharing the risk associated with uncertainty about the quality of a product: to be efficient in this sense, it will apportion this risk in accordance with the risk-aversion of the participants. My main concern here is with the risk-sharing aspects of guarantees. This is partly because these seem to be the most tractable aspects of the problem, but also stems from a belief that these are the most important aspects. Casual empiricism suggests that except in rather unique cases, a product is usually designed and produced before any attention is given to the choice of guarantee terms: these are then chosen as part of a marketing package. In such situations, the reliability of the product will clearly be independent of the