Interpersonal comparison necessary for Arrovian aggregation
Interpersonal comparison necessary for Arrovian aggregation
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Arrovian 聚合所需的人际比较
DOI：
10.1007/s00355-017-1048-6
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发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Hirofumi Yamamura
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hirofumi Yamamura
虽然社会福利函数的研究表明，一些人际可比性，如序数和水平可比性和基数和单位可比性解决阿罗的不可能性定理，解决这个问题所需的信息仍然不清楚。为了解决这个问题的知识体系中的这一缺陷，本研究捕捉，然后表征的信息结构，使社会福利功能满足强帕累托，Anciliity，无关的替代品的独立性。从这个特征中我们知道，如果效用水平不具有人际可比性，那么通过某种变换变换后的效用函数必须具有基数和单位可比性。
While studies of social welfare functionals have shown that some interpersonal comparability such as ordinal and level comparability and cardinal and unit comparability resolves Arrow’s impossibility theorem, the kind of information necessary to solve this issue remains unclear. To address this shortcoming in the body of knowledge on this topic, the present study captures and then characterizes the features of informational structures that make available social welfare functionals satisfying Strong Pareto, Anonymity, and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. We know from this characterization that if utility levels are not interpersonally comparable, then transformed utility functions by a certain transformation need to be cardinal and unit comparable.