Network structure and institutional complexity in an ecology of water management games
Network structure and institutional complexity in an ecology of water management games
复制标题
水管理博弈生态中的网络结构和制度复杂性
DOI：
10.5751/es-06880-190423
复制
发表时间：
2014
影响因子：
4.1
通讯作者：
Peng Wang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Lubell;G. Robins;Peng Wang
社会生态系统是由一个复杂的游戏生态系统所控制的，这个游戏生态系统具有多个参与者、政策机构和问题，而不仅仅是孤立运作的单一机构。我们更新龙（1958年）的生态游戏，分析协调作用的演员和机构的背景下，在弗朗西斯科湾，加州的水资源管理游戏的生态。游戏的生态可操作性作为一个二分网络与参与机构的演员，指数随机图模型被用来测试网络的结构特征的假设。我们发现，政策协调主要是由跨越地理边界的联邦和州机构和合作机构促进的。与封闭相关的网络配置显示出与预测模型值最显著的偏离，这与Berardo和Scholz（2010）的“风险假设”一致，即封闭对于解决合作问题很重要。
Social-ecological systems are governed by a complex of ecology of games featuring multiple actors, policy institutions, and issues, and not just single institutions operating in isolation. We update Long's (1958) ecology of games to analyze the coordinating roles of actors and institutions in the context of the ecology of water management games in San Francisco Bay, California. The ecology of games is operationalized as a bipartite network with actors participating in institutions, and exponential random graph models are used to test hypotheses about the structural features of the network. We found that policy coordination is facilitated mostly by federal and state agencies and collaborative institutions that span geographic boundaries. Network configurations associated with closure show the most significant departures from the predicted model values, consistent with the Berardo and Scholz (2010) "risk hypothesis" that closure is important for solving cooperation problems.