Let a Non-barking Watchdog Bite: Cliptographic Signatures with an Offline Watchdog
Let a Non-barking Watchdog Bite: Cliptographic Signatures with an Offline Watchdog
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DOI：
10.1007/978-3-030-17253-4_8
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发表时间：
2019-04
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Sherman S. M. Chow;A. Russell;Qiang Tang;M. Yung;Yongjun Zhao;Hong-Sheng Zhou
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Sherman S. M. Chow;A. Russell;Qiang Tang;M. Yung;Yongjun Zhao;Hong-Sheng Zhou
研究了如何在盗图攻击下构造安全的数字签名方案。我们的工作利用一个离线看门狗，通过只对实现进行一次黑盒测试来削减Subversion的能力。以前的结果本质上依赖于一个在线看门狗，它需要收集所有通信的抄本(或消息的主动重新随机化)。我们首先在部分颠覆模型中给出了一个简单但通用的构造，其中密钥生成和签名算法可以被颠覆。然后，我们给出了完全颠覆模型下的第一个数字签名方案，在该方案中所有密码算法都可以被颠覆。此构造基于全域散列。在此过程中，我们增强了Russellet等人(密码2018)关于纠正一个被颠覆的随机预言的最近结果。
We study how to construct secure digital signature schemes in the presence of kleptographic attacks. Our work utilizes an offline watchdog to clip the power of subversions via only one-time black-box testing of the implementation. Previous results essentially rely on an online watchdog which requires the collection of all communicating transcripts (or active re-randomization of messages).We first give a simple but generic construction, without random oracles, in the partial-subversion model in which key generation and signing algorithms can be subverted. Then, we give the first digital signature scheme in the complete-subversion model in which all cryptographic algorithms can be subverted. This construction is based on the full-domain hash. Along the way, we enhance the recent result of Russellet al.(CRYPTO 2018) about correcting a subverted random oracle.