Efficient Financial Crises
Efficient Financial Crises
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有效的金融危机
DOI：
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Ariel Zetlin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ariel Zetlin
分析了银行和其他金融机构的最优资本结构和投资策略。我们开发的条件下，银行最佳选择一个脆弱的资本结构，是受运行。我们发现，当银行存款人承诺长期贷款安排的能力有限时，他们严格地倾向于贷款给银行使用短期债务，而不是长期债务或股权。我们认为，当有多家银行，同样有限的承诺，存款人会导致他们更喜欢一个金融体系中，银行追求相关的，风险投资，而不是一个银行追求独立的，风险较小的投资。在最优金融体系中，偶尔会发生危机，所有的银行都要进行事后无效率的清算，从这个意义上说，金融危机是有效率的。
We analyze the optimal capital structure and investment strategy of banks and other financial institutions. We develop conditions under which banks optimally choose a fragile capital structure that is subject to runs. We show that when bank depositors have limited ability to commit to long-term lending arrangements, they strictly prefer to lend to banks using short-term debt rather than with long-term debt or equity. We argue that when there are multiple banks, the same limited commitment of depositors leads them to prefer a financial system in which banks pursue correlated, risky investments as opposed to one in which banks pursue independent, less risky investments. The optimal financial system features occasional crises in which all banks are subject to ex-post inefficient liquidations, and in this sense, financial crises are efficient.