Assignment Messages and Exchanges
Assignment Messages and Exchanges
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作业消息和交换
DOI：
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Paul R. Milgrom
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Paul R. Milgrom
“分配消息”是使用特定线性规划来参数化可替代偏好的消息。“转让交换”是一种简化的瓦尔拉斯交换，参与者仅限于报告转让信息。简化机制的任何纯Nash或e-Nash均衡都是简化前瓦尔拉斯机制的Nash或e-Nash均衡。通过对基本分配消息的进一步限制，交换产生整数值分配，从而推广了Shapley-Shubik分配机制。报告之间的连接分配交流和上升多产品时钟拍卖，一个单一的产品，和Vickrey拍卖的双重拍卖。应用程序包括一些情况下的Leontieff补充。
“Assignment messages” are messages that parameterize substitutable preferences using a particular linear program. An “assignment exchange” is a simplified Walrasian exchange in which participants are restricted to report only assignment messages. Any pure Nash or e-Nash equilibrium of the simplified mechanism is a Nash or e-Nash equilibrium of the Walrasian mechanism before simplification. With a further restriction to basic assignment messages, the exchange yields integer-valued allocations, thus generalizing the Shapley-Shubik assignment mechanism. Connections are reported between assignment exchanges and ascending multi-product clock auctions, double auctions for a single product, and Vickrey auctions. Applications include some cases of Leontieff complements.