Crime and punishment: Distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment
Crime and punishment: Distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment
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DOI：
10.1016/j.cognition.2008.03.006
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发表时间：
2008-08-01
期刊：
影响因子：
3.4
通讯作者：
Cushman, Fiery
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Cushman, Fiery
最近的道德心理学研究试图根据行为的因果性和故意性特征来描述行为的道德判断模式。本研究直接比较了结果、因果、信念和欲望在决定道德判断中的作用。人们发现，对行为的错误性或可容许性的判断主要依赖于行为主体的精神状态，而对指责和惩罚的判断则共同依赖于行为主体的精神状态和与有害后果的因果关系。同样，对于惩罚和指责的选择性判断，如果伤害是通过独立手段发生的，那么对那些试图造成更多伤害但没有造成更多伤害的人的判断会比根本没有发生伤害的人更宽容。对这些现象提出了一种解释，即区分道德判断的两种过程：一种是从有害后果开始，寻找因果责任的代理人；另一种是从行为开始，分析对该行为负责的精神状态。(c) 2008 Elsevier B.V.版权所有
Recent research in moral psychology has attempted to characterize patterns of moral judgments of actions in terms of the causal and intentional properties of those actions. The present study directly compares the roles of consequence, causation, belief and desire in determining moral judgments. Judgments of the wrongness or permissibility of action were found to rely principally on the mental states of an agent, while judgments of blame and punishment are found to rely jointly on mental states and the causal connection of art agent to a harmful consequence. Also, selectively for judgments of punishment and blame, people who attempt but fail to cause harm more are judged more leniently if the harm occurs by independent means than if the harm does not occur at all. An account of these phenomena is proposed that distinguishes two processes of moral judgment: one which begins with harmful consequences and seeks a causally responsible agent, and the other which begins with an action and analyzes the mental states responsible for that action. (c) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.