A conservation auction for landscape linkage in the southern Desert Uplands, Queensland

A conservation auction for landscape linkage in the southern Desert Uplands, Queensland
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昆士兰州南部沙漠高地景观联系保护拍卖

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发表时间:
2009
期刊:
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Andrea Lingard
Andrea Lingard
中科院分区:
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文献类型:
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作者:
J. Windle;J. Rolfe;J. McCosker;Andrea Lingard

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保护拍卖是一种基于市场的工具(MBI),它可以实现比下放拨款等方法更具成本效益的公共资金分配。本文概述了在放牧区进行多轮保护拍卖以改善生物多样性管理的情况。拍卖的目的是在昆士兰南部沙漠高地生物区开发一条野生动物走廊,并改善对牧场地区的管理。保护拍卖结合了两个重要的新设计特征。首先,有必要促进土地所有者的合作,以便在整个区域内协调和连接拟议的更好的土地管理区域。第二个创新设计特点是进行多轮招标(三轮),这与单一招标的标准应用不同。拍卖的结果是批出了覆盖八万五千公顷残余植被的保育合约,平均每公顷每年的费用为$2*。虽然整个沙漠高地没有实现完整的景观连通性,但超过70%的成功投标,占超过62000公顷(占总投标面积的77%),是形成独特走廊或景观联系的群体的一部分,只有单一或部分财产缺口。结果还表明,多轮投标提高了拍卖效率(对政府而言),尽管连通性几乎没有改善。在第一轮和第三轮之间,以35万美元的预算,可以多购买66%的环境效益单位。
Conservation auctions are a type of market-based instrument (MBI) that can achieve a more cost-efficient allocation of public funds than approaches such as devolved grants. In this paper, the conduct of a multiple round conservation auction to improve biodiversity management in a rangelands area is outlined. The auction was designed to develop a wildlife corridor across the southern Desert Uplands bioregion in Queensland and to improve management of rangelands areas. The conservation auction incorporated two important new design features. First, there was a need to promote landholder cooperation so that proposed areas for better land management were aligned and connected across the region. The second innovative design feature was to hold multiple bidding (three) rounds, which differs from the standard application of a single bidding round. The auction outcomes resulted in conservation contracts covering 85 000 ha of remnant vegetation awarded at an average cost of $2* per hectare per annum. Although complete landscape connectivity across the Desert Uplands was not achieved, over 70% of the successful bids, accounting for over 62 000 ha (77% of the total bid area), were part of a group that formed a distinct corridor or landscape linkage with only single or part-property gaps. The results also indicate that multiple bidding rounds improved auction efficiency (for the government), although there was little improvement in connectivity. Sixty-six percent more environmental benefit units could be purchased for the given budget of $350 000 between rounds one and three.