Maximal Domain of Preferences in the Division Problem
Maximal Domain of Preferences in the Division Problem
复制标题
除法问题中的最大偏好域
DOI：
10.1006/game.2001.0850
复制
发表时间：
2001
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
A. Neme
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jordi Massó;A. Neme
分配问题包括在一组 n 个代理人之间分配一定数量的完全可分的商品。 Sprumont（1991）表明，如果代理人对其股票具有单峰偏好，那么统一分配规则就是唯一的策略证明、有效和匿名规则。我们确定了最大偏好集，其中包含单峰偏好集，在该集合下，存在至少一个满足策略证明性、效率和强对称性的规则。此外，我们表明我们的表征意味着 Ching 和 Serizawa（1998）结果的稍弱版本。经济文献杂志分类号：D71、D78、D63。
The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, then the uniform allocation rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. We identify the maximal set of preferences, containing the set of single-peaked preferences, under which there exists at least one rule satisfying the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, and strong symmetry. In addition, we show that our characterization implies a slightly weaker version of Ching and Serizawa's (1998) result. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D71, D78, D63.