Implementation of a multi-agent environmental regulation strategy under Chinese fiscal decentralization: An evolutionary game theoretical approach
Implementation of a multi-agent environmental regulation strategy under Chinese fiscal decentralization: An evolutionary game theoretical approach
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中国财政分权下多主体环境规制策略的实施：演化博弈理论方法
DOI：
10.1016/j.jclepro.2018.12.252
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发表时间：
2019-03-20
影响因子：
11.1
通讯作者：
Li, Zhendong
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jiang, Ke;You, Daming;Li, Zhendong
演化博弈论为解析中国污染企业、地方政府和中央政府之间的互动策略提供了一个强有力的工具。在这方面，现行的财政分权体制制度规定，监管任务由中央政府确定，并在地方政府一级执行。在决定企业为减少污染和遵守国家指令而承担的成本程度时，这种授权塑造了管理者的激励机制。管理者的选择集是从LG层面的决策中形成的，在LG层面，监管机构在追求环境质量与行业默契勾结的经济回报之间进行平衡。LG和PE的激励措施在CG层面上塑造和塑造结果，决策者决定他们支持和监督LG行为的程度。通过探索不同参与者行为的演化及其演化稳定策略（ESS）与动态方程的重复，EGT使这种迭代的，互动的，三人游戏的一个强大的，定量的分析，一个数值例子来验证理论结果，并支持四个关键的见解。首先，环境战略的选择体现为一个不断调整和优化的动态过程。第二，LG通过整合CG和PE的决策来权衡替代环境战略。第三，降低CG层面的监管成本，从而加强对当地违规行为的处罚，并以有助于进化博弈收敛于理想决策状态的方式改善缓解激励。第四，即使在完全没有中央监管或LG监管机构的污染企业处于高度主导地位的情况下，稳定的均衡也无法持续，无法让LG维持“竞相逐底”的行为。因此，EGT不仅揭示了博弈结果的全部变量集，它还揭示了LG和PE之间不同程度的合谋的后果，以及重新设计激励机制以改革中国监管制度和改善市场结果的选择。(C)2018爱思唯尔有限公司版权所有。
Evolutionary game theory (EGT) provides a powerful tool with which to unpack the interactive strategies of polluting enterprises (PEs), local government regulators (LG), and central government planners (CG) in China. Here, the prevailing institutional system of fiscal decentralization sees regulatory mandates set by the CG and enforced at the LG level. This delegation shapes managers' incentives when deciding the degree to which firms will incur costs to reduce pollution and comply with state directives. Manager's choice sets draw shape from decisions at the LG level, where regulators balance the pursuit of environmental quality with the economic payoffs of tacit collusion with industry. LG and PEs incentives reciprocally shape and draw shape from outcomes at the CG level, where policymakers decide the degree to which they will support and supervise the behavior of LGs. By exploring the evolution of different participants' behavior and their evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) in line with the duplication of dynamic equations, EGT enables a robust, quantitative analysis of this iterative, interactive, three-player game, A numerical example serves to verify the theoretical results and support four key insights. First, the selection of environmental strategies manifest in a dynamic process of constant adjustment and optimization. Second, LGs outperform by integrating decisions from both CG and PEs in weighing alternative environmental strategies. Third, reducing regulatory costs at the CG level cascades to strengthen penalties for local violations and improve mitigation incentives in ways that aid an evolutionary game to converge on an ideal decision state. Fourth, a stable equilibrium cannot persist to allow LGs to sustain behaviors towards a "race to the bottom", even in the total absence of central regulation or high levels of dominance of polluting firms of LG regulators. EGT thus not only outcomes shed light on the full variation set of game outcomes, it also reveals the consequences of variable levels of collusion between LGs and PEs and options for the redesign of incentive mechanisms to reform the regulatory regime and improve market outcomes in China. (C) 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.