Bail-Ins and Bailouts: Incentives, Connectivity, and Systemic Stability
Bail-Ins and Bailouts: Incentives, Connectivity, and Systemic Stability
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DOI：
10.1086/719758
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发表时间：
2017-08
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
Benjamin Bernard;A. Capponi;J. Stiglitz
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Benjamin Bernard;A. Capponi;J. Stiglitz
本文将金融危机干预内生为监管机构与陷入困境银行债权人之间的战略谈判。银行参与自愿纾困的动机来自于它们面临的金融危机风险。在均衡状态下，只有当监管机构不救助破产银行的威胁可信时，救助才有可能发生。与没有干预或只有政府救助的模型相反，稀疏网络之所以能提高福利，主要有两个原因：它们提高了监管机构对大规模冲击不救助威胁的可信度；当威胁可信时，它们减少了救助贡献者的搭便车动机。
This paper endogenizes intervention in financial crises as the strategic negotiation between a regulator and creditors of distressed banks. Incentives for banks to contribute to a voluntary bail-in arise from their exposure to financial contagion. In equilibrium, a bail-in is possible only if the regulator’s threat to not bail out insolvent banks is credible. Contrary to models without intervention or with government bailouts only, sparse networks enhance welfare for two main reasons: they improve the credibility of the regulator’s no-bailout threat for large shocks, and they reduce free-riding incentives among bail-in contributors when the threat is credible.