Cooperation in Symmetric and Asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemma Games
Cooperation in Symmetric and Asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemma Games
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对称与非对称囚徒困境博弈中的合作
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.968942
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发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
F. Maier
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Martin Beckenkamp;Heike Hennig�?Schmidt;F. Maier
我们通过实验研究了固定伙伴设计中 40 期囚徒困境博弈中不对称性对合作的影响。我们区分高回报和低回报的对称囚徒困境和由两种对称困境相结合的非对称博弈。不对称性显着降低了合作，因为低类型玩家在相互合作后更有可能背叛，而高类型玩家比前者更频繁地发起合作。不对称性也会对合作的稳定性产生显着的负面影响，使得长序列的相互合作极其罕见。
We experimentally study the effect of asymmetry on cooperation in a 40 period prisoner's dilemma game in fixed partner design. We distinguish between a high and low payoff symmetric prisoner's dilemma and an asymmetric game combined out of both symmetric ones. Asymmetry significantly decreases cooperation, as low-type players are more likely to defect after mutual cooperation while high-type players initiate cooperation more often than the former. Asymmetry also has a significant negative effect on the stability of cooperation rendering long sequences of mutual cooperation extremely rare.