Putting Auction Theory to Work: Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding
Putting Auction Theory to Work: Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding
复制标题
将拍卖理论付诸实践：通过打包竞价进行升序拍卖
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Paul R. Milgrom
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Paul R. Milgrom
介绍了采用一揽子招标的递增拍卖及其经济用途，并总结了最近FCC发起的此类拍卖试验的主要结果。建立了解释实验结果的基准模型。在基准模型中，如果每个投标者在每一轮都“直接”地为其潜在的最有利可图的方案出价，那么总收益大约会被最终分配最大化--这里的所有收益近似都有与投标增量成正比的误差界。在只有两个投标人的情况下，直接的竞价策略构成了一个近似均衡，但也可能存在其他均衡。竞争对手都直接出价的投标人得到的最好答复是出价直接，但延迟最大，这表明对拍卖完成时间的担忧。引入了一类新的简单的“竞价改进规则”，防止了这种延迟并加快了拍卖速度，而不会相对于未修改的基准不必要地降低拍卖性能。结果被用来为FCC拍卖设计制定建议。
Ascending auctions with package bidding and their economic uses are explained and the main results of recent FCC-sponsored experiments with such auctions are summarized. A benchmark model is formulated that accounts for the experimental results. In the benchmark, if each bidder bids "straightforwardly" at each round for its potentially most profitable package, then the total payoff is approximately maximized by the final allocation—all payoff approximations here have error bounds proportional to the bid increment. With just two bidders, straightforward bidding strategies constitute an approximate equilibrium, but there can also be other equilibria. A bidder whose competitors all bid straightforwardly has a best reply that entails bidding straightforwardly but with maximal delays, suggesting a concern for the auctions time-to-completion. A new class of simple "bid improvement rules" is introduced that prevents such delays and accelerates the auction without unnecessarily degrading auction performance relative to the unmodified benchmark. The results are used to formulate recommendations for the FCC auction design.