Eliciting the Socially Optimal Allocation from Responsible Agents
Eliciting the Socially Optimal Allocation from Responsible Agents
复制标题
从负责任的代理人那里获得社会最优分配
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2922522
复制
发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Battal Doğan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Battal Doğan
我们考虑设计一种机制，在没有货币转移的情况下在代理之间分配对象。有一个社会最优分配，这是众所周知的代理，但不能观察到的设计者。设计者可能有关于责任代理的存在的信息。一个负责任的代理，当他的目标在两个不同的分配之间是无关紧要的，如果第一个分配比第二个更接近最优分配，在这个意义上，所有在第二个分配中被分配了他们的最优目标的代理也在第一个分配中被分配了他们的最优目标，并且在第一分配中至少还有一个代理接收其最优对象。我们表明，如果设计者知道，至少有三个负责任的代理人，即使不知道的身份负责的代理人，最优分配可以引起。
We consider designing a mechanism to allocate objects among agents without monetary transfers. There is a socially optimal allocation, which is commonly known by the agents but not observable by the designer. The designer possibly has information about the existence of responsible agents. A responsible agent, when indifferent between his objects at two different allocations, prefers the first allocation to the second if the first allocation is closer to the optimal allocation than the second, in the sense that all the agents who are allocated their optimal objects in the second allocation are allocated their optimal objects also in the first allocation, and there is at least one more agent in the first allocation receiving his optimal object. We show that, if the designer knows that there are at least three responsible agents, even if the identities of the responsible agents are not known, the optimal allocation can be elicited.