The costs and benefits of balanced budget rules: Lessons from a political economy model of fiscal policy
The costs and benefits of balanced budget rules: Lessons from a political economy model of fiscal policy
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.03.001
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发表时间：
2016-04-01
影响因子：
9.8
通讯作者：
Coate, Stephen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Azzimonti, Marina;Battaglini, Marco;Coate, Stephen
本文分析了Battaglini和Coate（2008）的政治经济学模型中要求立法者不出现赤字的平衡预算规则的影响。主要结论是，该规则导致公共债务水平逐步降低。立法者在公共产品需求相对较低的时期减少债务。他们这样做是因为该规则通过限制未来的财政政策，提高了持有债务的预期成本。这一规则是否会增加公民福利，取决于对较低债务负担的好处与税收波动较大和公共产品供应反应较慢的成本进行比较。该模型的定量版本的开发，其中的成本和效益可以进行评估。福利损失的结果，如果债务水平时，该规则是强加的谎言，在长期分布的支持与无约束的均衡。(C)2016爱思唯尔B.V.保留所有权利。
This paper analyzes the impact of a balanced budget rule that requires that legislators do not run deficits in the political economy model of Battaglini and Coate (2008). The main finding is that the rule leads to a gradual reduction in the level of public debt. Legislators reduce debt in periods when the demand for public goods is relatively low. They do so because the rule, by restricting future fiscal policies, raises the expected costs of carrying debt. Whether the rule increases citizen welfare depends on a comparison of the benefits of a lower debt burden with the costs of greater volatility in taxes and less responsive public good provision. A quantitative version of the model is developed in which costs and benefits can be evaluated. A welfare loss results if the debt level when the rule is imposed lies in the support of the long-run distribution associated with the unconstrained equilibrium. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.