Efficient multiunit auctions for normal goods
Efficient multiunit auctions for normal goods
复制标题
普通商品的高效多单位拍卖
DOI：
10.3982/te3430
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发表时间：
2020
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
Brian Baisa
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Brian Baisa
我研究有效的多单位拍卖设计时，投标人有私人价值，多单位的需求，和非准线性偏好。没有准线性，维克雷拍卖失去了其预期的激励和效率属性。而不是假设投标人有准线性偏好，我假设投标人有积极的财富效应。这嵌套的情况下，投标人规避风险，面临财务约束，或有budgets.With两个投标人，我表明，有一种机制，保留了理想的性能的维克里拍卖当且仅当投标人有一维类型。如果投标人具有多维类型，则不存在满足（1）个体理性、（2）优势策略激励相容性、（3）事后帕累托效率和（4）弱预算平衡的机制。当有两个以上的投标人，我表明，有没有机制，理想的激励和效率属性，即使投标人有一维类型。
I study efficient multi-unit auction design when bidders have private values, multi-unit demands, and non-quasilinear preferences. Without quasilinearity, the Vickrey auction loses its desired incentive and efficiency properties. Instead of assuming that bidders have quasilinear preferences, I assume that bidders have positive wealth effects. This nests cases where bidders are risk averse, face financial constraints, or have budgets.With two bidders, I show that there is a mechanism that retains the desirable properties of the Vickrey auction if and only if bidders have single dimensional types. If bidders have multi-dimensional types, there is no mechanism that satisfies (1) individual rationality, (2) dominant strategy incentive compatibility, (3) ex-post Pareto efficiency, and (4) weak budget balance. When there are more than two bidders, I show that there is no mechanism with desirable incentive and efficiency properties, even if bidders have single dimensional types.