Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations
Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations
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DOI：
10.1016/j.bulm.2004.03.004
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发表时间：
2004-11-01
影响因子：
3.5
通讯作者：
Nowak, MA
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Taylor, C;Fudenberg, D;Nowak, MA
我们引入了一个有限种群的随机进化博弈动力学模型，它类似于我们所熟悉的无限种群的复制因子动力学。我们的重点是有利于新表型入侵和/或固定的选择条件。对于无限种群，有三种通用的选择情景描述了两种策略之间的进化博弈动态。对于有限种群，有八种选择情景。对于固定的收益矩阵，不同的人口规模可能会出现许多这样的情况。我们将讨论几个具有意外行为的例子。(C) 2004数学生物学学会。Elsevier Ltd.出版。版权所有。
We introduce a model of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations which is similar to the familiar replicator dynamics for infinite populations. Our focus is on the conditions for selection favoring the invasion and/or fixation of new phenotypes. For infinite populations, there are three generic selection scenarios describing evolutionary game dynamics among two strategies. For finite populations, there are eight selection scenarios. For a fixed payoff matrix a number of these scenarios can occur for different population sizes. We discuss several examples with unexpected behavior. (C) 2004 Society for Mathematical Biology. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.