The IRB paradox: Could the protectors also encourage deceit?
The IRB paradox: Could the protectors also encourage deceit?
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DOI：
10.1207/s15327019eb1504_5
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发表时间：
2005-01-01
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Koocher, GP
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Keith-Spiegel, P;Koocher, GP
一些机构审查委员会（IRB）努力行使被认为是适当的监督，可能会导致调查人员感到受到不公正对待的欺骗。一个组织公正的范式提供了一个有用的背景下，探索为什么某些IRB行为可能会导致调查人员认为，他们没有得到公平的待遇。反过来，这些感觉可能导致调查人员故意欺骗，而IRB很少会发现。奇怪的是，IRB过度的保护热情实际上可能会鼓励一些研究者的不当行为。作者认为，通过培养一种调查人员认为他们得到公平和公正对待的氛围，IRB优化了合议遵守适当参与者保护的可能性。
The efforts of some institutional review boards (IRBs) to exercise what is viewed as appropriate oversight may contribute to deceit on the part of investigators who feel unjustly treated. An organizational justice paradigm provides a useful context for exploring why certain IRB behaviors may lead investigators to believe that they have not received fair treatment. These feelings may, in turn, lead to intentional deception by investigators that IRBs will rarely detect. Paradoxically, excessive protective zeal by IRBs may actually encourage misconduct by some investigators. The authors contend that, by fostering a climate in which investigators perceive that they receive fair and unbiased treatment, IRBs optimize the likelihood of collegial compliance with appropriate participant protections.