Trade Credit and Supplier Competition
Trade Credit and Supplier Competition
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2849641
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发表时间：
2017-12
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Chod;Evgeny Lyandres;S. A. Yang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Chod;Evgeny Lyandres;S. A. Yang
本文探讨了供应商之间的竞争如何影响他们提供贸易信贷融资的意愿。供应商向现金紧张的零售商提供贸易信贷，使后者能够增加从其他供应商的现金购买，从而导致搭便车问题。在零售商的采购中所占份额较小的供应商将零售商增加支出所带来的利益的一小部分内部化，因此，相对于其销售额而言，提供的贸易信贷较少。因此，供应商分散的零售商获得的贸易信贷少于供应商集中的零售商。当搭便车供应商是其产品市场竞争者时，搭便车问题对贸易债权人尤其不利，导致供应商之间的产品可替代性与前者提供给后者的贸易信贷之间存在负相关关系。我们使用模拟和真实的数据来检验模型。估计的关系与模型的预测一致，并且具有统计和经济意义。
This paper examines how competition among suppliers affects their willingness to provide trade credit financing. Trade credit extended by a supplier to a cash constrained retailer allows the latter to increase cash purchases from its other suppliers, leading to a free rider problem. A supplier that represents a smaller share of the retailer’s purchases internalizes a smaller part of the benefit from increased spending by the retailer and, as a result, extends less trade credit relative to its sales. In consequence, retailers with dispersed suppliers obtain less trade credit than those whose suppliers are more concentrated. The free rider problem is especially detrimental to a trade creditor when the free-riding suppliers are its product market competitors, leading to a negative relation between product substitutability among suppliers to a given retailer and trade credit that the former provide to the latter. We test the model using both simulated and real data. The estimated relations are consistent with the model’s predictions and are statistically and economically significant.