A prospect theory Nash bargaining solution and its stochastic stability
A prospect theory Nash bargaining solution and its stochastic stability
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前景理论纳什讨价还价解及其随机稳定性
DOI：
10.1016/j.jebo.2020.11.009
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发表时间：
2021
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Sawa Ryoji
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Dan Qin;Sawa Ryoji
我们考虑了当参与者服从前景理论时讨价还价博弈的长期结果。我们将Young（1993）的演化讨价还价模型扩展到两阶段纳什需求博弈。在第一阶段，两个参与人同时选择是否行使外部选择权，在第二阶段进行纳什需求博弈，只有当两个参与人都不行使外部选择权时，才会达到纳什需求博弈。我们解决的随机稳定划分的参考依赖的偏好的参考点是外部选项的值的影响。我们表明，该司一贯不同的纳什讨价还价的解决方案下的期望效用理论。受此启发，我们提出了一个前景理论纳什谈判解，它与随机稳定分割相吻合。
We consider the long-run outcomes of bargaining games when players obey prospect theory. We extend the evolutionary bargaining model of Young (1993) to a two-stage Nash demand game. Two players simultaneously choose whether to exercise an outside option in the first stage and play the Nash demand game in the second stage, which will be reached only if neither player exercises the outside option. We address the influence on the stochastically stable division of reference-dependent preferences where the reference point is the value of the outside option. We show that the division consistently differs from the Nash bargaining solution under expected utility theory. Inspired by this, we propose aprospect theory Nash bargaining solution, which coincides with the stochastically stable division.