Advance Reservation Games
Advance Reservation Games
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提前预约游戏
DOI：
--
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发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
0.6
通讯作者：
D. Starobinski
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Eran Simhon;D. Starobinski
提前预订（AR）服务构成了几个经济分支的支柱，包括交通、住宿、餐饮以及最近的云计算。在这项工作中，我们使用博弈论来分析时隙AR系统中，客户在他们的交货时间不同。对于每个给定的时隙，请求服务的客户数量是遵循一般概率分布的随机变量。根据统计信息，客户决定是否在未来的插槽中预先预订服务器资源并收取费用。我们证明，只有两种类型的均衡是可能的：要么没有客户，使AR或只有客户的提前期大于一定的阈值，使AR。我们的分析进一步表明，使提供商利润最大化的费用可能会导致其他均衡，其中之一产生零利润。为了防止最终没有利润，提供商可以选择广告费用较低，产生保证但较小的利润。我们把最大可能利润与最大保证利润之比称为稳健性的代价。当顾客数为Poisson随机变量时，证明了在单服务台系统中保守性的代价为1，而在多服务台系统中保守性的代价可以任意高。
Advance reservation (AR) services form a pillar of several branches of the economy, including transportation, lodging, dining, and, more recently, cloud computing. In this work, we use game theory to analyze a slotted AR system in which customers differ in their lead times. For each given time slot, the number of customers requesting service is a random variable following a general probability distribution. Based on statistical information, the customers decide whether or not to make an advance reservation of server resources in future slots for a fee. We prove that only two types of equilibria are possible: either none of the customers makes AR or only customers with lead time greater than some threshold make AR. Our analysis further shows that the fee that maximizes the provider’s profit may lead to other equilibria, one of which yields zero profit. In order to prevent ending up with no profit, the provider can elect to advertise a lower fee yielding a guaranteed but smaller profit. We refer to the ratio of the maximum possible profit to the maximum guaranteed profit as the price of conservatism. When the number of customers is a Poisson random variable, we prove that the price of conservatism is one in the single-server case, but can be arbitrarily high in a many-server system.