Persistent Memory Security Threats to Interprocess Isolation
Persistent Memory Security Threats to Interprocess Isolation
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DOI：
10.1109/mm.2023.3264938
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发表时间：
2023-09
期刊：
影响因子：
3.6
通讯作者：
Naveed Ul Mustafa;Yan Solihin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Naveed Ul Mustafa;Yan Solihin
持久内存对象（PMO）是一个通用的系统抽象，用于在持久主内存中保存持久数据，由操作系统管理。PMO编程模型打破了进程间的隔离，因为它导致两个进程之间共享持久数据，因为它们交替访问同一个PMO。在本文中，我们将讨论PMO模型的安全含义。我们证明，该模型使一个过程影响另一个过程的执行，即使没有共享一个PMO随着时间的推移。如果两个进程通过其他未共享的PMO链接，这允许攻击者发起PMO间安全攻击。我们提出了正式的PMO间的攻击，他们的例子，和潜在的战略来抵御他们。
Persistent memory object (PMO) is a general system abstraction for holding persistent data in persistent main memory, managed by an operating system. A PMO programming model breaks interprocess isolation as it results in the sharing of persistent data between two processes as they alternatively access the same PMO. In this article, we discuss security implications of a PMO model. We demonstrate that the model enables one process to affect execution of another process, even without sharing a PMO over time. This allows an adversary to launch inter-PMO security attacks if two processes are linked via other unshared PMOs. We present formalization of inter-PMO attacks, their examples, and potential strategies to defend against them.