Trade Warfare: Tariffs and Cartels
Trade Warfare: Tariffs and Cartels
复制标题
贸易战：关税和卡特尔
DOI：
10.1016/s0022-1996(84)80002-1
复制
发表时间：
1983
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Barbara J. Spencer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
James A. Brander;Barbara J. Spencer
各国政府有动机干预国际市场，特别是鼓励出口卡特尔和对不完全竞争的外国公司的进口产品征收关税。虽然对外国垄断的最佳反应通常是关税，但如果需求非常凸，就像需求弹性不变的情况一样，特定补贴将是最佳的。如果考虑从价关税或补贴，如果需求弹性随着消费的增加而增加，则补贴是最佳的。从价和特殊情况下的关键条件通常适用于古诺寡头垄断。非合作性国际政策均衡的特点是出口卡特尔和抽租关税。
National governments have incentives to intervene in international markets, particularly in encouraging export cartels and in imposing tariffs on imports from imperfectly competitive foreign firms. Although the optimal response to foreign monopoly is usually a tariff, a specific subsidy will be optimal if demand is very convex, as with constant elasticity demand. If ad valorem tariffs or subsidies are considered, a subsidy is optimal if the elasticity of demand increases as consumption increases. The critical conditions in both ad valorem and specific cases hold generally for Cournot oligopoly. Noncooperative international policy equilibrium will be characterized by export cartels and rent-extracting tariffs.