Executive Networks and Firm Policies: Evidence from the Random Assignment of MBA Peers
Executive Networks and Firm Policies: Evidence from the Random Assignment of MBA Peers
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高管网络和公司政策：来自 MBA 同行随机分配的证据
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1973031
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
K. Shue
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
K. Shue
利用哈佛商学院MBA学生历史上随机分配到不同部门的情况，我探索了高管同龄人网络如何影响管理决策和公司政策。在哈佛商学院班级内，同一部门的毕业生之间的公司业绩明显比不同部门的毕业生之间的结果更相似，高管薪酬和收购战略的影响最大。相对于行业同行的平均特征，薪酬和收购倾向都有10%-20%的弹性。我通过展示交错的校友聚会后一年的同辈效应是两倍以上，展示了持续的社交互动的重要作用。各种各样的其他测试表明，同伴影响力可以通过对同伴结果的直接反应来发挥作用，这种方式不一定有助于提高公司的生产率。
Using the historical random assignment of MBA students to sections at Harvard Business School, I explore how executive peer networks can affect managerial decision-making and firm policies. Within an HBS class, firm outcomes are significantly more similar among graduates from the same section than among graduates from different sections, with the strongest effects in executive compensation and acquisitions strategy. Both compensation and acquisitions propensities have elasticities of 10-20% with respect to the mean characteristics of section peers. I demonstrate the important role of ongoing social interactions by showing that peer effects are more than twice as strong in the year immediately following staggered alumni reunions. A variety of other tests suggest that peer influence can operate through direct reactions to peer outcomes in ways that do not necessarily contribute to firm productivity.