Practical DoS Attacks on Embedded Networks in Commercial Vehicles
Practical DoS Attacks on Embedded Networks in Commercial Vehicles
复制标题
针对商用车嵌入式网络的实际 DoS 攻击
DOI：
10.1007/978-3-319-49806-5_2
复制
发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
R. Gamble
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
S. Mukherjee;H. Shirazi;I. Ray;J. Daily;R. Gamble
控制器局域网（CAN）协议已成为乘用汽车和商用车车载通信的主要选择。然而，恶意攻击者可能会利用CAN协议设计或实现中的缺陷造成重大损害。研究人员已经证明，攻击者可以远程将恶意消息注入CAN网络，以破坏或改变正常的车辆行为。其中一些攻击可能会对车辆和驾驶员造成灾难性后果。虽然有几种针对基于CAN的攻击的防御技术，但可以使用物理和远程可控的电子控制单元（ECU）等攻击表面来对在CAN网络上运行的协议发起攻击，例如SAE J1939协议。商用车遵守SAE J1939标准，该标准使用CAN协议进行物理通信，并以类似于ISO/OSI 7层协议栈的方式建模。我们认为，J1939标准可以受到类似的攻击，已经成功地推出了OSI层协议。为此，我们演示了如何在一个测试台上进行这种攻击，该测试台具有3个通过单个高速CAN总线连接的J1939 ECU。我们的主要目标是表明，通过操纵J1939数据链路层标准制定的数据包交换协议和规范，可以中断J1939发言ECU执行的常规操作。本文中记录的攻击列表并不全面，但考虑到商用车辆中J1939标准的同质和普遍使用，我们认为这些攻击，沿着未来引入的新攻击，如果不主动缓解，可能会对重型车辆行业造成广泛的损害。
The Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol has become the primary choice for in-vehicle communications for passenger cars and commercial vehicles. However, it is possible for malicious adversaries to cause major damage by exploiting flaws in the CAN protocol design or implementation. Researchers have shown that an attacker can remotely inject malicious messages into the CAN network in order to disrupt or alter normal vehicle behavior. Some of these attacks can lead to catastrophic consequences for both the vehicle and the driver. Although there are several defense techniques against CAN based attacks, attack surfaces like physically and remotely controllable Electronic Control Units (ECUs) can be used to launch attacks on protocols running on top of the CAN network, such as the SAE J1939 protocol. Commercial vehicles adhere to the SAE J1939 standards that make use of the CAN protocol for physical communication and that are modeled in a manner similar to that of the ISO/OSI 7 layer protocol stack. We posit that the J1939 standards can be subjected to attacks similar to those that have been launched successfully on the OSI layer protocols. Towards this end, we demonstrate how such attacks can be performed on a test-bed having 3 J1939 speaking ECUs connected via a single high-speed CAN bus. Our main goal is to show that the regular operations performed by the J1939 speaking ECUs can be disrupted by manipulating the packet exchange protocols and specifications made by J1939 data-link layer standards. The list of attacks documented in this paper is not comprehensive but given the homogeneous and ubiquitous usage of J1939 standards in commercial vehicles we believe these attacks, along with newer attacks introduced in the future, can cause widespread damage in the heavy vehicle industry, if not mitigated pro-actively.