Social learning strategies regulate the wisdom and madness of interactive crowds
Social learning strategies regulate the wisdom and madness of interactive crowds
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DOI：
10.1038/s41562-018-0518-x
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发表时间：
2019-02-01
影响因子：
29.9
通讯作者：
Laland, Kevin N.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Toyokawa, Wataru;Whalen, Andrew;Laland, Kevin N.
为什么一群人有时会表现出集体的“智慧”，而其他时候则表现出适应不良的“羊群效应”，这是一个持久的难题。在这里，我们表明，这种明显的冲突是由社会学习策略部署。我们通过一个有699名参与者的交互式在线实验研究了人类社会学习的模式，改变了任务的不确定性和群体规模，然后使用分层贝叶斯模型拟合来识别参与者表现出的个人学习策略。重复任务会引起个体之间更大的一致性，复制率随着群体规模的增加而增加，导致面临不确定性的大型群体中出现羊群行为的可能性很高。相反，小群体的社会学习减少，社会信息在挑战性较小的任务中准确的可能性更大，在其他情况下产生了“群体智慧”效应。我们基于模型的方法提供的证据表明，集体智慧与羊群行为的可能性可以预测，解决了文献中长期存在的难题。
Why groups of individuals sometimes exhibit collective 'wisdom' and other times maladaptive 'herding' is an enduring conundrum. Here we show that this apparent conflict is regulated by the social learning strategies deployed. We examined the patterns of human social learning through an interactive online experiment with 699 participants, varying both task uncertainty and group size, then used hierarchical Bayesian model fitting to identify the individual learning strategies exhibited by participants. Challenging tasks elicit greater conformity among individuals, with rates of copying increasing with group size, leading to high probabilities of herding among large groups confronted with uncertainty. Conversely, the reduced social learning of small groups, and the greater probability that social information would be accurate for less-challenging tasks, generated 'wisdom of the crowd' effects in other circumstances. Our model-based approach provides evidence that the likelihood of collective intelligence versus herding can be predicted, resolving a long-standing puzzle in the literature.