Platform Market Competition with Endogenous Side Decisions
Platform Market Competition with Endogenous Side Decisions
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DOI：
10.1111/jems.12305
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发表时间：
2019-01
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Choi;Yusuke Zennyo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Choi;Yusuke Zennyo
本文建立了一个分析双边市场中平台竞争的框架，在这种市场中，代理内生地决定加入平台的哪一方。我们描述了均衡定价结构，并对代理人的偏好分布如何影响平台的利润进行了比较静态分析。我们还表明，利润最大化平台下的市场均衡导致第一优社会剩余，这说明了价格机制在诱导双方更均衡参与方面的重要性。这个框架可以用于分析“租赁”或“共享”平台的市场竞争。此外，我们将分析扩展到考虑初始投资阶段，这使得参与者成为一些耐用品的所有者以出租。
This paper develops a framework to analyze platform competition in two‐sided markets in which agents endogenously decide on which side of a platform to join. We characterize the equilibrium pricing structure and perform a comparative statics analysis on how the distribution of agents’ preferences affects the platforms’ profits. We also show that the market equilibrium under profit‐maximizing platforms leads to the first best social surplus, which illustrates the importance of the price mechanism to induce more balanced participation across the two sides. This framework can be applied to analyze market competition for “rental” or “sharing” platforms. In addition, we extend our analysis to consider an initial investment stage, which makes participants the owner of some durable goods to rent out.