Partially-Specified Large Games
Partially-Specified Large Games
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部分指定大型游戏
DOI：
10.1007/11600930_2
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发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
E. Kalai
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
E. Kalai
纳什均衡对战略和信息细节的敏感性使得将其应用于不完全指定的博弈时存在困难。结构稳健的纳什均衡对这些细节不太敏感。此外，它们自然出现在有许多半匿名玩家的重要游戏类别中。本文介绍了这种情况及其影响。
The sensitivity of Nash equilibrium to strategic and informational details presents a difficulty in applying it to games which are not fully specified. Structurally-robust Nash equilibria are less sensitive to such details. Moreover, they arise naturally in important classes of games that have many semi-anonymous players. The paper describes this condition and its implications.