Strategic upfront marketing channel integration as an entry barrier

Strategic upfront marketing channel integration as an entry barrier
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DOI:
10.1016/j.ejor.2012.02.041
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发表时间:
2012-08
期刊:
Eur. J. Oper. Res.
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
K. Matsui
K. Matsui
中科院分区:
其他
文献类型:
--
作者:
K. Matsui

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本文研究了一个动态非合作博弈环境下的组织设计问题,即在产品市场竞争中,双寡头企业应该纵向整合还是纵向分离其营销渠道。以往的运筹学模型表明,如果两家企业面临零售价格竞争,与整合相比,采用两部分关税合同的营销渠道分离是每个企业的主导策略,从而构成子博弈完美纳什均衡(SPNE)。相反,以前的见解,本文表明,如果外生参数的特点固定成本,产品的替代性,和需求函数落入一个特定的区域,营销渠道整合占主导地位的分离战略时,两家公司之一是现任公司,而另一个是潜在的进入者。换句话说,当我们考虑进入威胁时,价格制定博弈中众所周知的结果可以逆转。具体来说,我们表明,前期的垂直整合的营销渠道,使现任者阻止潜在竞争对手的进入,并垄断市场的SPNE。这一结果对面临潜在竞争对手进入市场的威胁的企业具有操作意义,因为企业可以使用这种明显劣势的战略作为承诺手段,这创造了一个虚拟的进入壁垒。
This paper investigates an organizational design problem concerning whether duopolistic firms competing in a product market should vertically integrate or separate their marketing channels in a dynamic noncooperative game setting. Previous operational research models have shown that the separation of the marketing channel with the adoption of a two-part tariff contract is the dominant strategy compared with integration for each firm if the two firms face retail price competition, and thereby constitutes the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). Contrary to this previous insight, this paper demonstrates that if exogenous parameters that characterize fixed costs, product substitutability, and a demand function fall into a specific region, marketing channel integration dominates the separation strategy when one of the two firms is the incumbent firm while the other is a potential entrant. In other words, the well-known result in the price-setting game can be reversed when we take entry threats into consideration. Specifically, we show that upfront vertical integration of the marketing channel enables the incumbent to deter the entry of the potential competitor and to monopolize the market in the SPNE. This result has operational implications for a firm confronting the threat of potential rivals entering the market, in that the firm can use this apparently inferior strategy as a commitment device, which creates a virtual entry barrier.