Banking on Stability: The Political Economy of New Capital Requirements in the European Union
Banking on Stability: The Political Economy of New Capital Requirements in the European Union
复制标题
银行业稳定：欧盟新资本要求的政治经济学
DOI：
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
L. Quaglia
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Howarth;L. Quaglia
《巴塞尔协议III》（Basel III）于2010年底发布，旨在建立一个“增强银行和银行体系弹性的全球监管框架”，作为应对全球金融危机的国际监管措施的基石。然而，将其纳入欧盟（EU）立法受到了相当多成员国的保留，欧盟内部的谈判仍在进行中。本文研究了欧盟新资本要求的政治经济学，认为各国银行业的制度特征令人信服地解释了欧盟成员国对资本规则偏好的分歧。
Abstract The Basel III Accord on a ‘Global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems’ was issued in late 2010 as the cornerstone of the international regulatory response to the global financial crisis. Its adoption into European Union (EU) legislation has, however, been met with considerable member state reticence and intra-EU negotiations are ongoing. This paper investigates the political economy of new capital requirements in the EU, arguing that the institutional features of national banking sectors convincingly account for the divergence in EU member state preferences on capital rules.
市场化银行业务与国际金融危机
DOI：
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
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影响因子：
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作者：
Hardie, I
通讯作者：
Hardie, I