Subsidizing the Distribution Channel : Donor Funding to Improve the Availability of Products with Positive Externalities
Subsidizing the Distribution Channel : Donor Funding to Improve the Availability of Products with Positive Externalities
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发表时间：
2011
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通讯作者：
T. Taylor;Prashant Yadav
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作者：
T. Taylor;Prashant Yadav
发展中国家的大量人口缺乏获得基本药物等产品的充分途径，这些产品的使用会带来积极的外部性。由于私营部门分销渠道所起的关键作用，捐助者（例如全球基金）开始投入大量资源资助补贴，以鼓励该渠道改善这些产品的供应。捐助者面临的一个关键问题是，它是应该补贴私人渠道的购买还是销售。我们发现答案关键取决于消费者对产品的评价是同质的还是异质的。对于异质性消费者估值的情况，我们提供的证据表明，补贴销售导致更高的预期捐赠者效用、消费和社会福利。当消费者的估值是同质的，我们得出相反的结论：补贴购买会导致更高的预期捐赠者效用、消费和社会福利。
January 2011 Abstract Large populations in the developing world lack adequate access to products, such as essential medicines, whose use confers positive externalities. Because of the critical role played by the privatesector distribution channel, donors (e.g., the Global Fund) are beginning to devote substantial resources to fund subsidies that encourage the channel to improve the availability of these products. A key question for a donor is whether it should subsidize the purchases or sales of the private channel. We find the answer depends crucially on whether consumers are homogeneous or heterogeneous in their valuation of the product. For the case of heterogeneous consumers’ valuations, we provide evidence that subsidizing sales leads to greater expected donor utility, consumption, and social welfare. When consumers’ valuations are homogeneous, we establish the opposite conclusion: subsidizing purchases leads to greater expected donor utility, consumption, and social welfare.