The Logic of Campaigning
The Logic of Campaigning
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竞选活动的逻辑
DOI：
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
R. Parikh
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Walter Dean;R. Parikh
我们认为参加竞选的政治候选人是当选的。她当选的机会将取决于不同群体的选民对她的看法，以及他们对她的看法将取决于她说了什么。不同的选民群体可能有不同的偏好，一组选民喜欢的声明可能会被另一组选民不喜欢。此外，选民可能是乐观的(愿意把候选人想得最好的)，悲观的(倾向于期待最坏的)，或者预期有价值的选民，他们平均考虑了如果她当选可能出现的各种可能性。考虑到这些因素，她应该说些什么呢？我们在命题逻辑中形式化这个问题，具有一定的效用价值，以及对不同选民群体的特定偏好，并表明如果选民是预期的重视选民，那么她最好是尽可能明确。因此，由于乐观选民的存在，可能会出现不愿直言不讳的情况。
We consider a political candidate campaigning to be elected. Her chances of being elected will depend on how various groups of voters perceive her, and how they perceive her will depend on what she has said. Different groups of voters may have different preferences and a statement preferred by one group of voters may be disliked by another. Moreover, voters may be optimistic (willing to think the best of the candidate), pessimistic (inclined to expect the worse), or expected value voters, who average over various possibilities which may come about if she is elected. Given these considerations, what should she say? We formalize this problem in propositional logic with certain utility values, and certain intensities of preference for various groups of voters, and show that if the voters are expected value voters, then she is best off being as explicit as possible. Thus a reluctance to be explicit may come about as a result of the presence of optimistic voters.